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 Abstract 
 
In this paper we explore the changes in the relationship between female educational 
attainment and the risk of union disruption in seventeen countries: Austria, Estonia, Finland, 
Flanders (Belgium), France, West-Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. We start from the 
hypothesis presented by William J. Goode (1962; 1979; 1993), stating that in the Western 
countries, the initially positive relationship between social class and divorce would gradually 
change during the modernization process and waning of barriers to divorce, so that eventually 
there would either be no relationship between the two, or that the lower classes would divorce 
more. We expand the examination to all unions – not just marriages – due to the increasing 
importance of non-marital cohabitation in many of our countries. We run separate models for 
all unions. We first analyse the data within each of the seventeen countries with discrete-time 
event-history analyses. We find important variation across countries in the relationship 
between education and union disruption, and find that the relationship has become more 
negative in five countries. Second, we use multi-level models for event-histories in discrete 
time to examine the macro-level correlates of this variation. We report that a higher level of 
employment in service sector and higher percentages of economically active women are 
associated with a more negative relationship between education and union disruption. Overall, 
we find support – although not unanimous – for Goode’s hypothesis, and conclude that the 
waning of social, and economic barriers to union disruption increases the risk of union 
disruption relatively more among the less educated. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Increasing marital instability has been among the most visible features of family change in the 
Western countries. Even though the general trend has been similar across the industrialized 
world, this development has, however, taken different timings, levels, and paths in different 
societies, thus raising questions of the underlying societal factors responsible for these 
differences (e.g., Cherlin, 1981; White, 1990; Castles and Flood, 1993; Lesthaeghe, 1995; 
Ono, 1999). In addition to societal factors, students of divorce have analysed the impacts of 
various individual and family related factors on the risk of divorce (e.g., Goode, 1962; 
Bumpass and Sweet, 1972; Becker, 1981; Blossfeld et al., 1995; Dronkers, 2002). Results 
from these studies suggest important differences in divorce risks across social groups. These 
differentials reflect social inequalities not only in the opportunities for the dissolution of 
unhappy relationships, but in the possibilities for stable and satisfactory relationships as well. 
They also reflect social inequalities in the (mainly negative) consequences of divorce. The 
overrepresentation of divorce – and other “unconventional” family behaviour – in the lower 
social groups has raised concerns of the accumulation of disadvantages over different life 
spheres (McLanahan, 2004). 
 
Results pointing to social differentiation in family forms and family behaviour do not mean 
that these differences are necessarily stable across time and space. For example, the current 
American experience of the low class character of single parenthood and early births does not 
characterize all earlier periods or other countries (Ellwood and Jencks, 2004; McLanahan, 
2004). The same might apply to union dissolution. Studies on divorce trends have not for the 
most part considered the possibility of different trends across social groups (see, however, 
Martin and Bumpass, 1989; Hoem, 1997; Teachman, 2002; Chan and Halpin, 2005). Despite 
the widely applied implicit assumption of stability in divorce risk factors, there are theoretical 
reasons to expect different developments for social groups (Teachman, 2002: 332).  
 
William J. Goode was probably the first to argue for a link between societal factors and the 
social composition of divorce. In a series of papers (Goode, 1962; 1979; 1993), he suggested 
that the relationship between the social composition of divorce and the level of modernization 
is inverse. He expected that the once positive relationship between social status and divorce – 
characteristic of early stages of modernization with high legal, social, and economic barriers 
to divorce – will gradually fade away by the lifting of these barriers. In the “mature” stages of 
modernization with low legal, social, and economic costs to divorce, divorce risks may finally 
be higher in the lower classes, which generally have higher marital strain. Following this line 
of thought, we can also expect cross-country differences in the social structure of divorce, 
which can be linked to particular variables reflecting the social environment of marriage and 
divorce. 
 
In this paper, we examine the effects of female education on union disruption over time in 
seventeen countries (Austria, Estonia, Finland, Flanders (Belgium), France, West-Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
USA). We use education as the indicator of social status, due its central role in modern 
stratification systems. Because of the increasingly important role of unmarried cohabitation as 
a “trial marriage” and even an alternative to marriage, we examine both marriages and all 
unions together, regardless of their marital status. 
 
Starting from Goode’s hypothesis, we ask 1) whether there are cross-country differences in 
the educational gradient of union dissolution, 2) whether the effect of education on union 
dissolution has become more negative across time, and whether this is a consistent pattern
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across countries, 3) whether we arrive in significantly different results when we examine all 
first unions instead of first marriages only, and 4) whether the differences between countries 
and across time can be linked to macro-level variables reflecting the legal and socio-economic 
environment of family life? We focus our attention on first unions and first marriages, 
because of the well-known differences in the marital processes of higher order 
marriages/unions (Martin and Bumpass, 1989). With data from the Fertility and Family 
Surveys (FFS), we perform discrete-time event history analyses in each country, and then 
continue with multi-level discrete-time event history analyses to test for explanations for the 
patterns found.  
 
Trends in divorce and union dissolution 
The general story of divorce in post-war industrialized countries has been an often dramatic 
increase. Figure 1 presents trends in total divorce rates (share of marriages predicted to end up 
in a divorce) in selected European countries. The figure shows a generally upward trend 
across the countries, even though cross-national differences remain remarkable. In 1995, half 
of all Swedish marriages were expected to dissolve, whereas less than ten per cent of Italian 
marriages had a similar prediction. But even in Italy, the main trend has been an increase in 
divorce risks since the mid-1970s. Similar trends are found across Europe and the United 
States, with a main exception of Latvia, where divorce risks have notably decreased after the 
peak in the early 1980s (OECD, 2002; Council of Europe, 2003). A considerable amount of 
research has been devoted to explaining these trends and the country differences in them. 
Explanations have focused on cultural change, changing gender roles, and “modernization” as 
a more all-encompassing development (Goode, 1970; Becker, Landes and Michael, 1977; 
White, 1990; Lesthaeghe, 1995). 
 
FIGURES 1 & 2 
 
The increases in non-marital cohabitation are another notable change in post-war family 
behaviour. In all of the countries included in this study, non-marital cohabitation increased in 
the younger cohorts, and in the most liberal countries, first unions starting as marriages now 
present a considerable minority (Figure 2; Andersson and Philipov, 2002). Figure 2 presents 
the trend in the percentage of first unions starting as consensual unions in selected countries, 
Table 1 shows the development all seventeen countries. From these results we can first of all 
see that cohabitation has become increasingly popular in each country. We can also detect 
three separate country clusters, with Estonia and Sweden being the fore-runners, most of the 
Central-European countries, Finland, Norway and the US catching up with some delay, and 
the more traditional catholic/orthodox countries starting later and having relatively low rates 
of pre-marital cohabitation still in the 1990s.  
 
TABLE 1 
 
The nature of cohabitation has also changed, as cohabitation spells have increased and non-
marital cohabitation has in some countries, such as Sweden, even begun to challenge marriage 
as a form of family life and longer-term commitment. Consensual unions have also become 
more widespread across the social structure (e.g., Andersson and Philipov, 2002; Villeneuve-
Gokalp, 1991; Finnäs, 1995; Bumpass and Lu, 2000; Murphy, 2000). However, despite the 
changing nature of cohabitation, non-marital unions have a higher risk of dissolution than 
marriages, and a focus on marriages only does not tell the whole story of the formation and 
dissolution of intimate cohabitational relationships in modern times (e.g., Finnäs, 1996; Raley 
and Bumpass, 2003).  
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Female education and union disruption: theoretical approaches 
The best-known hypothesis of the effects of female education on divorce comes from Gary 
Becker’s economic theory of the family (e.g., Becker, 1981). According to Becker, women’s 
educational attainment is positively related to their labour market opportunities – and thus 
chances of supporting themselves (and their children) regardless of the provision of the 
husband – while it is negatively related to (traditional) role specialization and mutual 
interdependence within the family. Since the benefits of marriage and cohabitation mainly 
stem from specialization (according to traditional roles) and interdependence, higher female 
educational attainment thus reduces the gains from marriage, and increases the risk of divorce. 
Other accounts have predicted a positive effect of female education on divorce by pointing the 
more liberal values these women are likely to hold (Levinger, 1976), and their better 
resources in handling the social, legal and economic aspects of the divorce process (Blossfeld 
et al., 1995). 
 
Some theories have, however, led to the opposite predictions of the effect of education on 
union dissolution. It has been argued, for instance, that education improves resources – such 
as social, cultural, economic and cognitive skills – that increase the stability of relationships, 
either by successful partner matching, or by enhancing communication skills and other factors 
that make a relationship work (Amato, 1996; Ono, 1998; Hoem, 1997; Dronkers, 2002). 
Others have emphasised the economic returns of higher education and their positive impact 
on marital life. Thus, in line with the original Goode hypothesis, we can assume that those in 
lower social strata have more marital strain due to greater socio-economic hardship, and 
therefore a higher likelihood of marital disruption (also Hoem, 1997; Oppenheimer, 1997; 
Jalovaara, 2003). Women with low education may also feel less tied by “middle-class” family 
norms (Amato, 1996). 
 
The theories discussed above predict different effects of female education on the risk of union 
disruption. However, they all have in common an assumption that unions are maintained as 
long as the well-being of the partner(s) exceeds that of dissolving the union (Teachman, 2002: 
331-2). Their main difference is in the mechanisms (economic, social, cultural, cognitive) 
emphasised, and less in the direction in the effect of these mechanisms. Thus, there seems to 
be no a priori reason to rule out the possibility that these mechanisms operate simultaneously, 
even though in the different direction. Thus the resulting effect of female education on union 
dissolution depends on the net effect of these different mechanisms.  
 
Are there reasons to expect that the educational gradient of union dissolution is different if we 
look at marriages only compared to all unions? Despite the increase in and the changing 
forms of cohabitation, the behaviour of married partners differs from that of non-married ones 
in many respects, even in countries like Sweden (e.g., Henz and Sundström, 2001). Marriages 
also have a different legal status than consensual unions, and the higher rates of union 
dissolution in non-marital unions further suggest that marriages provide more stability than 
consensual unions. Therefore, in line with the arguments presented below, one could expect 
that the effects of education on divorce are different – possibly more positive – if we focus on 
marriages instead of all unions. On the other hand, several commentators have pointed to 
possible selection effects. For example, Hoem (1997: 26) suggested that not only will entry 
into marriage be more selective on commitment to the marital institution, but also that as 
educational attainment levels rose, those with low education may be negatively selected also 
on their chances of entering marriages and maintaining them. This might suggest that, at least 
in some countries, those less educated women who do enter marriage are more committed to 
marriage than their higher educated sisters, and thus, the educational gradient of divorce 
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would be more positive than the educational gradient in union disruption regardless of marital 
status. American results by Raley and Bumpass (2003) seem to support this hypothesis.  
 
Cross-country and period differences in the effects of female education? 
We can discuss the expected cross-country and period differences in the effects of education 
from a cost-benefits point of view outlined above (Teachman, 2002). Teachman argued that 
the effects of the disruption risk factors might change because of the changes in the social 
environment is not perceived by all couples in the same way, and all couples do not thus react 
similarly to these changes. In general, when divorce is costly (in social, economic, and legal 
terms), any traits positively related to disruption risks will be suppressed, whereas when these 
costs are lower, such traits can “flourish”. He also argued that these changes might not affect 
all unions in the first place.  
 
From such a viewpoint, we can speculate the effects of three different environmental factors, 
which affect not only the costs of union disruption, but also the benefits of staying in a union. 
First, we can point to the legal environment of union disruption. The effect of the 
liberalization in divorce laws on divorce rates has been a topic of great interest, especially in 
the United States. Recent results suggest that divorce legislation does have a positive effect on 
divorce rates, at least in the short run (Friedberg, 1998; Wolfers, 2003). In line with the 
discussion above, we can expect that the strictness of divorce laws does not have equal effects 
on all unions. Goode (1970 [1963]: 85-86) made the hypothesis that strict divorce laws 
mainly suppress the divorce chances of the lower classes, while the upper classes are more 
resourceful to find their ways around. Goode continued to argue that with more liberal laws, 
“the normal difficulties of lower-class family life were permitted an expression in divorce” 
(ibid.).  
 
We can expect that social norms and conventions surrounding family life can produce similar 
differences. First of all, strict social norms against union disruption may require extra 
resources (such as high education) to overcome them, whereas loosened norms of union 
disruption reduce the importance of such resources. Second, if divorce and union disruption is 
relatively rare in a society, such behaviour is more innovative, thus, again, requiring more 
resources. Later, through social learning, such behaviour can diffuse to the wider population. 
Similar to other forms of demographic behaviour, union disruption patterns can also “trickle 
down” from the higher social groups to the lower ones (Chan and Halpin, 2004).  
 
The economic environment, including the welfare state, has an apparent possibility of 
affecting the relative costs and benefits gained from union disruption. First, good female 
labour market possibilities decrease women’s dependency on their husbands. When female 
participation in the labour market is acceptable and widespread, even the women with lower 
human capital have better chances for economic independence. The same can be said of the 
welfare state: when welfare state benefits and services are extensive and generous, women, 
especially with small children, can provide themselves independently, either by working or 
through benefits (cf. Orloff, 1993). Here again, more extensive and generous welfare states 
might be assumed to improve the disruption chances of the lower groups more. On the other 
hand, welfare states might also reduce the economic strain of the lower classes (cf. Hoem, 
1997; Oppenheimer, 1997; Jalovaara, 2003), thus reversing the relationship.  
 
In line with the tentative argumentation above, we can expect that the macro-level factors 
affect marriages differently compared to all unions.  
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Previous results and hypotheses 
What is the empirical evidence regarding the effects of education on union disruption, in 
different countries and at different times? In general, the results are mixed. American, Nordic, 
and British studies generally find a negative effect (e.g., Bumpass and Sweet, 1972; 
Berrington and Diamond, 1999; South, 2000; Hoem, 1997; Jalovaara, 2003; Lyngstad, 2004). 
Similar results were already found in the early American and British studies on the class 
gradient of divorce (Goode, 1951; Gibson, 1974). Other studies have, however, found 
different results. German and Dutch research has generally reported a positive effect (e.g., 
Diekmann and Klein, 1991; Kalmijn et al., 2004). Support for cross-national differences were 
further given by Blossfeld and colleagues (1995), who found the positive effects to be the 
strongest in Italy, weaker in Germany, and the weakest in Sweden. Comparative differences 
were also found in the cross-national case studies in Chester (1977). 
 
Few studies have explicitly tested whether there has been a change in the effect of female 
education on union disruption. Again, the results from the few studies, which have considered 
this possibility, have given conflicting results. Martin and Bumpass (1989) found that the 
effect had generally become more negative in the younger American marriage cohorts, 
whereas Teachman (2002) did not find such instabilities in the effect of education. However, 
again, the findings by Raley and Bumpass (2003) do seem to suggest that union disruption has 
increased in the lower groups, but stayed stable in the upper ones. They also reported that the 
change has been less pronounced among marriages than all unions. For the UK, Chan and 
Halpin (2005) found that the relationship between female education and divorce has changed 
from a positive to a negative one, and similar changes were also found in Sweden by Hoem 
(1997). In the Netherlands Dronkers (2002) reports a change in the relation between 
intelligence and union disruption during the second half of the 20th century.  
 
These results send a conflicting message. On the one hand, the cross-country (and some cross-
cohort) differences in the effects of education suggest that societal level factors have an effect, 
as suggested by the theoretical discussion above. On the other, one might expect that the 
within-country trends would be more consistent, knowing the profound changes in all post-
war Western societies, and in the family institution in particular.  
 
Based on the theoretical discussion and previous research, we formulate five hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: The effect of education on the risk of union disruption varies across countries. 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of education on union disruption is more positive if we focus only 
on marriages.  
Hypothesis 3: The effect of education on the risk of union disruption becomes more negative 
across time, and this is a consistent pattern across countries.  
Hypothesis 4: The change to a more negative educational gradient is less pronounced in 
marriages than in all unions.  
Hypothesis 5: More liberal divorce legislation and normative environment towards family 
issues, more generous social welfare systems, more prosperity and “modernity”, and more 
female labour market opportunities all change the effect of education on union disruption 
more negative.  
 
Data and methods 
Micro-data 
In the subsequent analyses we use data for our seventeen countries from the Fertility and 
Family Surveys (FFS), collected by the Population Activities Unit of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (see Andersson and Philipov, 2002). The FFS is a 
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retrospective survey, which includes information on the fertility, family, education, and 
occupational histories of the interviewed. The data were collected between 1989 and 1999, in 
different years in different countries. For the analyses we selected the first partnerships 
(whether cohabiting or married) of women who had entered such relationships 1 . To be 
suitable for discrete-time event-history analysis, we re-organized the data into person-year 
form2 (Yamaguchi, 1991). After considerable data cleaning, we ended up with a sample of 52 
150 women, 604 178 person-years, and 12 880 union disruptions in 17 countries (see table 2). 
Our dependent variable is union disruption, which was coded 1 if the union dissolved during a 
particular year, and 0 otherwise3.  
 
TABLES 2 & 3 
 
The independent variable of most interest to us is educational attainment. We could not find 
complete educational histories for many of the countries, and thus had to resort to using the 
educational attainment at the time of the interview. Although the measure is subject to reverse 
causation and the distributions in some countries look unfamiliar, we chose this measure as 
the most straightforward of the ones available. We ruled out the use of years of education due 
to serious problems in this measure in some countries, and as mentioned, many countries 
lacked educational histories, in particular reliable ones. The education variable was coded into 
three categories, according to the ISCED scheme: low (0-2), middle (3), and high (4-6). Table 
3 gives the percentages of the latter two categories, both total and per country, based on year-
person units. 
 
Our other explanatory variables are duration, duration squared, year of the start of the first 
union, age at start of the first union, a dummy indicating parental divorce, a dummy indicating 
a birth before the union and a dummy indicating whether the woman was married to her 
partner at a specific point in time (see Table 3). Of these variables, parental divorce is the 
only proper control variable, whereas the last three are better seen as intervening variables. 
The Norwegian data missed the parental divorce variable and for that reason it will only be 
included in the within-country analyses and without a control for parental divorce. 
 
In the analyses, we use union cohort (the year the couple started living together) to measure 
the changing social environment of union disruption. However, because we include duration 
(linear and quadratic terms) in the models, and since cohort plus duration equals period, the 
effects of union cohorts can be interpreted either as cohort or as period effects (see Allison, 
1995: 142-3; Teachman, 2002). Following Teachman (2002), we interpret the union cohort 
variables as capturing the period effect of a change in the social context of family life4. This 
                                                          
1
 The processes affecting the survival and dissolution of higher order unions are notoriously different from those 
of first unions (e.g. Martin and Bumpass, 1989). In an earlier version of the paper we experimented with 
different union types without major differences in the conclusions. 
2
 The FFS would have allowed us to build a person-month file as well. Since handling and analysing the data 
was computationally burdensome already as it is, we did not want to change to a person-month file, especially as 
preliminary analyses suggested no major differences in the results.  
3
 Because in some countries (Italy, Poland, Greece, Spain) there were only a few union dissolutions in the early 
periods, we did not censor durations of ten, fifteen, or twenty years. However, the models with a censoring on 
the 15th year of the union (if still intact) gave very similar results (not shown). We coded death and “forced 
living apart together” also as censored. A competing-risks analysis with these categories did not change our 
results. 
4
 Following Thornton and Rodgers (1987) and Teachman (2002), we also tested whether risk of union disruption 
at different durations varied across the partnership cohorts. In a model with the main and squared effect of 
duration, and an interaction between duration and partnership cohort (not shown), we did not find stability of 
dissolution risk at different durations across cohorts. We thus conclude that, if we disregard the assumption of a 
Stability and change in the effects of female educational attainment on the risk of union dissolution 
7 
interpretation is also supported by the large literature pointing to the importance of period 
effects over cohort effects, whether of birth cohorts or marriage cohorts (Thornton and 
Rodgers, 1987; Heaton, 1991; Lutz et al., 1991; however, Ono 1999)5.  
 
Macro-variables  
In order to analyze the effects of macro-level factors, we collected data on divorce legislation, 
social policies, values, family practices, and the “general level of modernization” (see 
Appendix). The time-dependent nature of the variables varied. For some measures (for 
instance divorce legislation, extra-marital births, female economic activity, and urbanization 
levels) we were able to find data for rather long time periods. For others (such as value 
measures), we had to restrict ourselves to a few time-points, or even only one. In general, with 
the exception of divorce legislation, a decade was the basic unit of time used. For some 
societies, in particular the former Eastern Bloc, the accuracy of some data might, of course, be 
questioned. Their averages and standard deviations are given in table 3, based on the year-
person categories, both total and per country. If the standard deviation of a macro-variable of 
a country is zero that variable is not time dependent, but varies between the countries only. If 
the standard deviation of a macro-variable of a country is not zero that variable is time 
dependent and varies both between the countries and in time. In the case of the divorce-laws 
characteristics the lack of variation in time reflects the stability of the divorce law of a country 
and not a lack of data. In the case of the opinion on ‘whether divorce is justifiable’ the lack of 
variation in time reflects a lack of more than one wave to measure this value.  
 
Divorce legislation. The strictness of divorce legislation is measured with a single time-
dependent variable. During the period of study, divorce legislation varied considerably from 
prohibition of divorce to unilateral no-fault divorce. We use a three-fold categorisation as our 
divorce law measure (cf. Glendon, 1987; Castles and Flood, 1993): 
(1) Divorce not permitted (1a), or permitted on the grounds of fault or other major 
disruption of marital life (1b). Institutionalisation of marriage remains the leading 
principle, and the divorce process (if permitted) hard and lengthy. 
(2) Divorce permitted, possibly alongside (1b), on mutual consent of the spouses, 
prolonged separation, other measure of factual breakdown of marriage, or other less 
restrictive legislation. Shows more understanding for the will of the spouses. 
(3) No (or very minor) judicial ground to deny divorce: unilateral non-fault divorce 
granted on the basis of the will of either spouse with very short waiting or 
“reconsideration” times. 
We joined (1a) and (1b) into a common category, because the small number of events in (1a) 
did not permit sustainable analysis. We use this category also as the reference category. 
 
Data on the divorce laws of each country were collected from Boschan (1972), Chester (1977), 
Chloros (1978), Lobodzinska (1982), Moskoff (1983), Glendon (1987; 1989), Goode (1993), 
Nakonezny et al. (1995), Friedberg (1998), and Hamilton and Perry (2002). In some cases, 
classifying a country into only of the categories was not very straightforward. The trickiest 
case was the United States, where individual states have their own divorce laws (Glendon, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
strong interaction effect between partnership cohort and duration, our data support the hypothesis of period 
effects instead of cohort effects. We included the linear and quadratic effects of duration instead of the more 
widely used strategy of comparing risks at two different durations because in some countries the numbers of 
dissolutions at particular intervals were not big enough to allow sustained analyses. Our conclusion for the 
importance of period versus cohort is also supported by the similarity of our results, when the models were ran 
with a censoring of the longest intact unions (>15 years).  
5
 Using a direct period measure would have been inconvenient, since in Italy, Spain, Greece, and Poland the 
number of union disruptions in the early periods was too small to permit sustainable analyses.  
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1987, 1989; Nakonezny et al., 1995; Friedberg, 1998). Since we could not distinguish 
between different states, we treated the US as a single case. We used the year 1970 (when 
California as the first state enacted a no-fault legislation) as a breakpoint between categories 1 
and 2, and the year 1985 (when South Dakota was the last state to enact no-fault divorce) as a 
breakpoint in a move from category 2 to category 3. This solution admittedly provides only an 
approximation, but since “divorce tourism” between states was possible (Castles and Flood, 
1993), and since the law in many cases was a dead letter with pressures from neighbouring 
states, we regard this as a second-best option.  
 
Social policies. Social policy generosity is measured by two variables, social expenditure per 
GDP and family cash benefits per GDP. The former was used to capture general welfare state 
generosity and social protection (and the extent to which one can gain a living independently 
of the labour market or the family), while the latter was chosen to reflect more targeted social 
expenditure. For most countries, we were able to construct good time-series of the 
developments of these social policy measures with data from the ILO (1967; 1988) and the 
OECD (1997). The exception was Poland, for which we found data for only one point in time.  
 
Values. Values were measured with two variables, the percentage of denounced atheists to 
measure (non)religiosity (Barrett et al., 2001) and the national mean of a ten-point scale of the 
question of whether one finds divorce justifiable or not, from the World Values Study (1981; 
1990; 1995) and the European Values Study (for Greece) (1999). For the former variable, the 
first data were found from 1970 onwards (projected back for earlier periods), for the latter, 
mainly from 1981 only.  
 
Family practices. We measure family practices with a single time-dependent variable of 
“unconventional family types”, which is a sum measure of the percentage of extra-marital 
births, the share of divorces per 100 marriages, and the percentage of 25-year olds who have 
ever lived in a consensual union (OECD 2002; Council of Europe 2000; FFS standard country 
tables http://www.unece.org/ead/pau/ffs/f_h_151b.htm). These variables were strongly 
correlated (0.7-0.8), and therefore they were combined to proxy the social costs of divorce 
and the “conventionality” of the family institution.  
 
Modernity and the labour market. We use three variables as indicators of labour market 
conditions and “modernity”: the degree of urbanization, the percentage of employment in the 
service sector, and the percentage of economically active women of all working aged women 
(World Bank World Development Indicators; ILO Labour statistics http://laborsta.ilo.org/; 
Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000: 349; United Nations Common Database 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd).  
 
Models 
Within-country discrete-time event history models 
In our first analyses, we model the effects of female education on the risk of union disruption 
separately in each country with discrete-time event history analysis techniques (Yamaguchi, 
1991). Event-history analysis regresses the conditional probability of experiencing an event at 
time t (union disruption), conditional on that it has not happened before, on selected 
covariates (discussed above).  
 
Multi-level models 
To explain the patterns found from the within-country event history analyses, we continue our 
analyses by using multi-level discrete-time event history models to test for the effects of the 
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macro-variables. Replacing countries with variables has been generally regarded as a valuable 
strategy in comparative research (e.g., Przeworski and Teune, 1970). Here, we have an 
additional dimension, historical time, and therefore we replace country at a specific period 
(measured by union cohort in the within-country models) with direct measures of divorce 
legislation, social policies, values, demographical practices, and the level of the economy. To 
analyze these data, the data file is restructured into a two-level data structure: countries and 
duration of the first union (organized in person-years). This representation allows us to use 
models for binary response variables in a multilevel context (Hox, 2002).  
 
The model can be written as:  
 
( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0logit ij ij j jh t t x t z uα β β= + + + .    (1) 
 
The hazard function h(t) is the probability of the event occurring in interval t conditional upon no 
earlier occurrence. In our case, the time variable t is the length of the union at time t. In this 
equation α (t) is the baseline hazard at union-year t, xij represents the micro level predictors and zj 
represents the country predictors. The u0j are the country level residual errors; since this is a logit 
model for binary outcomes there is no women level error term (cf. Hox, 2002). The regression 
coefficient α for the effect of union-duration may or may not vary across countries; in our case 
there was between country variation which did not disappear when all available individual 
predictors were included in the model. The regression coefficients β for the women level 
predictors may or may not vary across countries. The model was estimated using MLwiN 
(Rasbash et al., 2000). 
 
Results from within-country event-history analyses  
Gross and net effects of education 
Table 4 presents results from the discrete-time event history analyses by country. Models A in 
the first columns give the “gross” effect of educational attainment, when year of start of union, 
parental divorce, and the linear and quadratic terms of duration are the only variables adjusted 
for. Models B in the second columns show the effect of education, net of the effect of the 
three important confounding variables (age at start of union, child before union, and the time-
dependent term for marriage). The estimates for the other explanatory variables are mostly as 
expected. Women who have divorced parents, who start their first union at a young age and 
who have a child before the union have higher risks of union disruption than other women. 
The duration terms show a familiar shape, and in most countries there is a trend towards more 
union disruptions in the later cohorts.  
 
TABLE 4 
 
The estimates for the education dummies show cross-country variation in both of the models. 
The gross effect of education is consistently negative Austria, Lithuania and the USA. In 
Latvia high education decreases the risk of union dissolution, but the effect is only weakly 
significant. Women with high or middle-level educated women have higher dissolution risks 
in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. In Greece and Switzerland only the high educated have 
more union disruptions and in Poland the positive effect is limited to those with middle 
education. In all other cases the differences are not statistically significant.  
Inclusion of the confounding variables in Models B does not change the result of the cross-
national differences, but does make the estimates of education more positive in practically all 
cases. Germany, Greece, Spain and Switzerland are exceptions in this regard. In Latvia and 
Juho Härkönen and Jaap Dronkers 
10 
Lithuania the originally negative effect of high education, and in the US the negative effect of 
middle education, become non-significant in Model B. In Germany and Switzerland the 
originally positive estimates become non-significant, and in the Nordic countries the non-
significant effects of high education in Model A become positive and significant. With the 
exceptions of Germany, Greece, Spain and Switzerland, the change in the effects of education 
between the two models means that on the aggregate level, women with lower education are 
more likely to engage in behaviours that increase the risk of union disruption. On the basis of 
these models, we can conclude that there are cross-national differences in the effects of 
education on the risk of union disruption, which cannot be explained by cross-national 
differences in dissolution risk increasing behaviours by educational level. The results in Table 
4 thus support out first hypothesis.  
 
Does a focus on marriages make a difference? 
In Table 5 we analysed all unions. What if we restrict the analyses to marriages only? Table 5 
compares estimates between Model A for first unions and a comparable Model A for first 
marriages. The later estimates for first marriages are from our companion paper (Härkönen 
and Dronkers, forthcoming). The first column repeats the estimates for education from the 
previous table, and the second column shows the estimates for the effects of education for 
first marriages. The third column gives the difference between the estimates and the fourth the 
standard error for this difference.  
 
TABLE 5 
 
The clear result is that in most cases focusing on first marriages instead of first unions does 
not make the conclusions about the effects of education different. The estimates show 
statistically significant differences for both educational levels in Germany, Lithuania and 
Switzerland. We can detect a (more or less) significant difference for high education in 
Greece, Latvia, Poland and the United States, and a weakly significant difference for middle 
education in Hungary. The difference in the estimates does not seem to correlate with the 
predominance of unmarried cohabitation. Furthermore, we do not find differences in countries 
like Sweden or Estonia, where cohabitation is the most common (cf. Hoem, 1997). In the 
cases where the difference is statistically significant, the sign of the coefficient is in most 
cases negative, although in others it is positive. Only in Switzerland does the sign of the 
coefficient change. All in all, we do not find support for our second hypothesis, and conclude 
that, in general, the choice between selecting all first unions versus selecting first marriages 
does not change the conclusions considerably.  
 
Changes in the educational gradient of union dissolution? 
Next we move on to test our third and fourth hypotheses, that is, we examine whether there 
has been a consistent change towards more a negative educational gradient in union 
dissolution, and whether this change has been more pronounced for marriages compared to all 
unions.  
 
In Table 6, we test whether there has been a change in the educational gradient of union 
disruption. We focus here on all unions, and compare Models A with Models A with the 
interaction between education and union dissolution. We test the fit of these models with 
ordinary chi-square tests. The first column shows the difference in chi-squares and degrees of 
freedom between the models in each country, the second column gives the statistical 
significance of the difference, and the last four columns report the coefficients of the main 
terms and interaction terms of the equation.  
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TABLE 6 
  
Table 6 shows that in six countries (France, Greece, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden and the USA), 
the model with the interaction term provides a better fit than the one without at the 5 % level 
of significance, and in one additional country (Hungary) the fit is better at the 10 % level of 
significance. Therefore, in seven out of the seventeen countries there has been a change in the 
educational gradient of union disruption. With the exception of Greece, the coefficients show 
that the educational gradient has become increasingly negative, that is, the risk of union 
dissolution has increased among the less educated relative to those with more education. In 
two countries (France and Poland), both interaction coefficients have a negative sign, and in 
Greece, both have a positive sign. In the other countries, there has been a decrease of the 
relative risks of dissolution only for women with tertiary education. It should also be noted 
that in Finland, Italy, and Latvia, the interaction term between tertiary education and year of 
marriage is negative and significant, although the model with both interaction terms does not 
fit better than the one without. In conclusion, our third hypothesis (the educational gradient 
becomes more negative) receives full support for two countries (France and Poland), and 
partial support (the relative risk has decreased for women with tertiary education) for seven 
countries. Greece is the obvious outlier, there the change in the educational gradient strongly 
contradicts our prediction. Finally, figures 2a to 2q show these developments in the 
educational gradient of union disruption in each of the countries in a more visual form. The 
graphs show the risk of union disruption for women with different educational levels at 
different periods (measured by union cohort), relative to the disruption risk of the low 
educated women in the oldest cohort (reference group), after controlling for all independent 
variables of model B in table 4. 
 
FIGURES 2A TO 2Q 
 
Would our conclusions be different if we focused on first marriages only? We examine this in 
Table 7. The first two rows report whether the difference in the χ² -statistic between the main 
effects model and the interaction term model was significant or not, for the models for first 
unions and first marriages, respectively. The next four columns show the coefficients for the 
interaction terms for comparison.  
 
TABLE 7 
 
The results in Table 7 lead to a similar conclusion as those in Table 5: the choice between first 
unions and first marriages does not, in most countries, change our conclusions. In Flanders, 
Finland and Italy we can find a significant change in the educational gradient of disruptions in 
the case of first marriages but not in the case of all unions (this result supporting our fourth 
hypothesis), while in Greece the situation is the opposite. In all the other countries, the choice 
of the specific type of union does not change the main conclusions.  
 
Results from multilevel event-history analyses6 
Table 8 begins the multilevel analyses (model A) with union disruption as the dependent 
variable and only the duration and duration squared as independent variables, but with the 
                                                          
6
 We restrict ourselves her to the multilevel analysis of the union disruption of all unions. The results for only 
marriages are basically similar (Härkönen & Dronkers, forthcoming).  
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merged file of all countries7. As one can see in the bottom row, significant between-country-
variance remains. Model B adds the all the micro variables and the interactions ‘middle 
education*union year’ and ‘high education*union year’. The two parameters of ‘high 
education’ and ‘middle education’ are both significant and positive, but the interaction ‘high 
education*union year’ is also significant and negative. This means that in the oldest union 
cohort the educational gradient on union disruption is positive but that it is smaller in the 
younger union cohorts. We tested (results here not shown) whether the parameter estimates of 
‘high education’ and ‘middle education’ vary across the countries. Because the random-
variance of these two parameters was significantly large, these parameters are indeed different 
between countries. 
 
TABLE 8 
 
Models C to K add separately each macro-variable and its interaction with the two 
educational level dummies to model B in order to explain the change in the effect of 
education on union disruption. Most macro-variables have a significant effect on union 
disruption. More liberal divorce laws, higher social expenditure, higher percentage atheists, 
higher acceptance of divorce as justifiable, higher percentages unconventional family types, a 
higher urbanisation degree, more employment in services and higher percentage economic 
active women increase the odds of union disruption. But more family cash benefits decreases 
the odds of union disruption. The parameter estimates of the micro-variables remain 
considerably stable. The interactions between the macro-variables and educational level are in 
many cases significant. The results show the risk of union disruption is relatively lower for 
women with middle or high education than for those with low education when unconventional 
family types are common, the urbanisation level is higher, the service sector is larger, and 
when women are more economically active at the labour market. This suggests support for 
our fourth hypothesis. However, with increasing government spending on social policies in 
general and family cash benefits in particular, the relationship between education and 
disruption risk seems to become more positive, contrary to what we expected. Next we 
examine how these results change when we include all the significant macro-level variables 
into the same model.  
 
TABLE 9 
 
In table 9 we combine the multilevel analyses of table 8. Model L is equal to model B of table 
7, but without the insignificant interaction ‘middle education*union year’. Model M includes 
the main effects of those macro variables that had a significant influence on the odds of union 
disruption and declined the amount of between-country-variance: unconventional family 
types, employment in service sector and percentages of economically active women. The 
main effects of these three macro variables are as expected. Model N further includes all 
interactions between these three macro-variables and high educational level. The parameter 
estimates of the interaction terms mainly have the same sign as those in Table 8, as suggested 
by our fifth hypothesis. However, the interaction ‘unconventional family type*union year’ is 
not longer significant. Therefore, Model M supports our fourth hypothesis only partially, with 
divorce legislation being the main, and unexpected, exception. Our final model O has only 
two significant interactions ‘employment in service sector*union year’ and ‘percentages of 
economically active women*year of union’. Moreover by the inclusion of these two 
interaction the parameter of the interaction ‘high education*union year’ has decreased 
substantially. But our fifth hypothesis is our partial confirmed by these results More liberal 
                                                          
7
 Norway excluded, since it misses information on parental divorce. 
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divorce legislation and normative environment towards family issues, more generous social 
welfare systems and “modernity” does not change the effect of education on union disruption. 
Only female labour market opportunities and more prosperity makes the effect of education 
on union disruption more negative.  
 
Discussion 
In this paper, we have examined the relationship between female educational attainment and 
the risk of union disruption across union cohorts and sixteen European countries and the USA 
with data from the Fertility and Family Surveys. On the basis of the theoretical discussions 
and previous research, we expected that this effect varies across countries, and that the effect 
of education on union disruption would become more negative across time. We also aimed to 
link this variation to cross-national differences in divorce legislation, social policies, values, 
family practices, and social and labour market conditions across time and between countries.  
 
Although we report important cross-national variation in the effects of education on union 
disruption (positive or zero in some, negative in others), we did not find a constant pattern 
towards a more negative relationship through time. Instead, we found cross-national 
differences with regard to this development: in many countries, the effect remained stable, 
while in some it did become more negative over time, and in Greece, it seemed to have 
become more positive, contrary to our expectations. Therefore, William Goode’s (1962) 
hypothesis, which predicts that the increase in divorce risks will be more rapid in the lower 
than the upper strata, received partial support. But the support is both for the change of the 
educational gradient for disruption of first unions as for the divorce of first marriages. The 
different selectivity of marriages and unions is not a relevant distinction for the explanation of  
the change of the educational gradient for union or marriage disruption, contrary to Hoem’ s 
assumption (1997). 
 
We sought to explain this variation across countries and across time with several societal level 
variables reflecting the social, legal, and economic costs of union disruption. Here we again 
follow Goode’s original hypothesis, which claims that these costs have a more important 
impact on the disruption risks of the lower classes (or education, as in our case). We find 
support for some, but not all, of our society-level measures. When we entered the macro-level 
variables one by one, we found results in the expected direction (lower costs of disruption 
associated with a more negative relationship between education and dissolution risk) in most 
cases, social policies being the exception. The latter, unexpected, result may suggest that 
social policies can reduce economic strain of the less-off, thus reducing their risks of union 
dissolution. In the next step, we added the four macro-variables which had significant effects 
and reduced between-country variance (commonness of unconventional family types, size of 
the service sector, and female labour market activity rates) into a single multi-level event 
history model. The interaction term estimates remain rather similar, except in the case of 
commonness of unconventional family types.  
 
If we accept this summary of our results, Goode seems to have been right. When the (social) 
costs of union dissolution are high, one needs extra resources to dissolve the union, while 
when they are low, one needs more resources to maintain a relationship. Therefore, it seems 
that strict divorce regimes bias the composition of union dissolution towards the more well-
off, and make union disruption extremely hard in the lower ranks of society. Lax regimes, on 
the other hand, have the consequence of increasing dissolution risks especially for those with 
less education.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1: Percentage of first unions, first started as consensual unions, by decade when union began 
 
 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s Total 
Austria   2,5 11,4 41,2 74,1 34,4 
Flanders     1,5 15,2 48,7 12,8 
Estonia   65,5 66,1 76,6 90,8 78,1 
Finland 1,1 2,5 18,8 72,8   32,4 
France   2,7 14,1 60,7 94,6 47,5 
West-Germany     16 41,7 84 42,2 
Greece   
 
1,7 9,9 27,1 11,5 
Hungary     2 8,6 34,7 9 
Italy   0 0,5 4,1 14,8 4,6 
Latvia   2,8 4,7 10,6 44,4 14,4 
Lithuania   0 0,7 2,8 14,4 4,7 
Norway   2 16,4 78,2   43,2 
Poland   0,5 0,9 3,4 12,3 2,3 
Spain   0,8 0,9 5 22,5 6,9 
Sweden   33,3 71,5 88,3 93,9 82,1 
Switzerland   5,9 18,3 46,3 67,6 37,7 
USA   2,7 16,7 31,9 57,6 31,8 
Source: UNECE-PAU: Fertility and Family Surveys 
 
Table 2: Year of data collection, number of cases, person-years units and events (dissolution) by country 
 
 
Year collected 
 Cases  Person-years Dissolutions 
Austria 1995-96 3 860 54 447 928 
Flanders 1991-92 2 648 25 451 324 
Estonia 1994 1 442 16 512 416 
Finland 1989-90 3 689 48 075 884 
France 1994 2 493 28 112 1 012 
West Germany 1992 1 697 15 155 426 
Greece 1999 1 930 28 792 207 
Hungary 1992-93 2 911 30 786 544 
Italy 1995-96 3 245 47 125 211 
Latvia 1995 2 204 25 918 693 
Lithuania 1994-95 2 307 27 525 366 
Norway 1988-89 3 185 32 207 756 
Poland 1991 3 267 45 792 226 
Spain 1994-95 2 812 36 747 216 
Sweden 1992-93 2 994 30 364 1 104 
Switzerland 1994-95 3 468 41 317 852 
USA 1995 7 998 69 853 3 715 
Total  52 150 604 178 12 280 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics (mean of year-person units and standard deviation) of the individual characteristics and the macro-variables 
 
 Total Austria Flanders  Estonia Finland France Germany Greece Hungary Italy  Latvia Lithuania Norway Poland Spain Sweden Switzer 
land 
USA 
Duration in years 7.90 
6.42 
9.70 
7.76 
5.90 
4.63 
7.77 
6.38 
8.66 
6.87 
7.76 
6.40 
5.97 
4.87 
8.87 
6.64 
6.63 
5.17 
9.00 
6.78 
7.88 
6.36 
7.97 
6.43 
7.02 
5.68 
8.71 
6.62 
8.10 
6.25 
7.29 
6.01 
7.92 
6.34 
6.65 
5.73 
Parental divorce .10 
.31 
.09 
.29 
.07 
.26 
.21 
.41 
.06 
.23 
.12 
.33 
.10 
.31 
.03 
.17 
.15 
.36 
.03 
.16 
.20 
.40 
.15 
.36 
- .03 
.16 
.04 
.19 
.11 
.31 
.10 
.30 
.22 
.42 
Starting age union 21.60 
3.28 
21.26 
3.38 
21.39 
2.43 
21.68 
2.99 
21.87 
3.35 
21.05 
2.99 
21.07 
3.03 
21.51 
3.80 
20.26 
2.69 
22.33 
3.50 
21.71 
3.05 
22.05 
2.92 
21.91 
2.91 
21.67 
3.05 
22.52 
3.32 
20.70 
3.01 
22.79 
3.28 
20.98 
3.51 
Child before union .06 
.23 
.13 
.34 
.01 
.08 
.04 
.18 
.05 
.22 
.04 
.20 
.06 
.24 
.02 
.13 
.03 
.17 
.03 
.17 
.04 
.19 
.05 
.22 
.08 
.27 
.04 
.20 
.02 
.14 
.05 
.21 
.03 
.18 
.11 
.31 
Partnership cohort 74.39 
7.25 
72.77 
8.37 
76.34 
4.93 
74.29 
6.96 
68.54 
7.48 
73.94 
6.83 
77.07 
5.35 
78.46 
6.40 
76.27 
5.33 
74.77 
6.90 
75.56 
6.80 
75.82 
7.16 
71.29 
6.31 
71.44 
6.86 
76.26 
6.63 
73.82 
6.43 
75.14 
6.83 
76.99 
6.46 
Middle education level  .43 
.50 
.48 
.50 
.37 
.48 
.38 
.49 
.56 
.50 
.38 
.49 
.37 
.48 
.43 
.50 
.39 
.49 
.31 
.46 
.70 
.50 
.36 
.48 
.42 
.49 
.34 
.47 
.14 
.35 
.57 
.50 
.75 
.43 
.37 
.48 
High education level  .24 
.43 
.43 
.50 
.27 
.44 
.22 
.42 
.13 
.34 
.17 
.37 
.10 
.30 
.19 
.39 
.10 
.30 
.07 
.26 
.23 
.42 
.60 
.49 
.38 
.49 
.13 
.34 
.11 
.31 
.29 
.45 
.12 
.32 
.43 
.50 
Strict, Institutionalized 
divorce laws  
.09 
.28 
.00 
.00 
.86 
.35 
.00 
.03 
.00 
.00 
.14 
.35 
.00 
.00 
.18 
.38 
.00 
.00 
.46 
.50 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.01 
.07 
Less strict, more 
individual divorce laws  
.84 
.37 
1.00 
.00 
.14 
.35 
1.00 
.03 
.83 
.38 
.86 
.35 
1.00 
.00 
.82 
.38 
1.00 
.00 
.52 
.50 
1.00 
.00 
1.00 
.00 
1.00 
.00 
1.00 
.00 
.81 
.40 
.09 
.28 
1.00 
.00 
.99 
.07 
Pure unilateral divorce 
laws  
.06 
.24 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.17 
.38 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.91 
.28 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
% social expenditure of 
GDP  
19.01 
5.25 
23.45 
2.42 
24.95 
1.40 
13.50 
.61 
18.49 
4.63 
21.90 
4.63 
21.63 
1.96 
19.57 
4.29 
18.24 
1.47 
22.56 
2.44 
13.54 
.55 
13.54 
.52 
21.01 
3.72 
16.20 
.00 
17.94 
2.09 
29.95 
4.11 
16.99 
3.61 
12.93 
.96 
% of family cash 
benefits of GDP  
12.28 
8.46 
22.25 
2.58 
25.34 
3.63 
2.89 
.32 
12.59 
4.50 
21.88 
1.51 
12.71 
2.88 
7.87 
3.24 
27.10 
3.27 
8.40 
2.14 
2.92 
.28 
2.93 
.26 
12.33 
2.47 
18.00 
.00 
3.16 
1.50 
18.86 
4.02 
9.19 
2.76 
2.57 
1.18 
% atheists or non-
religious  
11.49 
9.62 
7.10 
1.06 
7.21 
.04 
39.61 
2.40 
5.28 
.60 
19.05 
1.18 
13.99 
6.42 
1.85 
.05 
12.55 
.26 
15.77 
.57 
35.38 
1.66 
14.17 
1.78 
2.14 
.25 
3.36 
1.24 
5.41 
.29 
29.31 
.64 
7.23 
.78 
8.82 
.34 
‘divorce justifiable’  52.61 
7.94 
49.00 
.00 
46.95 
3.78 
54.00 
.00 
64.92 
7.00 
55.72 
1.89 
55.35 
3.24 
63.00 
.00 
48.86 
2.10 
53.30 
1.27 
54.00 
.00 
40.00 
.00 
50.70 
2.49 
39.00 
.00 
54.25 
3.57 
62.33 
.95 
59.95 
6.96 
48.55 
.84 
unconventional family 
types  
82.41 
46.14 
105.85 
24.54 
55.01 
16.89 
135.57 
9.173 
105.55 
41.41 
93.99 
30.90 
86.34 
7.73 
40.96 
5.68 
67.71 
13.53 
18.45 
5.29 
109.81 
9.04 
74.24 
3.63 
99.09 
38.10 
25.29 
3.70 
25.44 
10.05 
170.46 
14.67 
84.23 
16.11 
122.91 
19.32 
degree urbanization 68.62 
9.63 
67.12 
.16 
95.98 
.57 
70.10 
1.58 
58.40 
4.19 
73.48 
.77 
84.14 
1.40 
58.49 
.71 
59.69 
2.81 
66.57 
.47 
69.16 
1.85 
64.81 
4.42 
70.32 
1.95 
58.52 
2.51 
74.30 
1.84 
82.97 
.50 
58.44 
1.56 
74.60 
.74 
Employment in 
services 
53.02 
10.87 
51.71 
3.92 
65.98 
4.04 
42.79 
1.73 
53.98 
5.46 
51.30 
5.11 
53.58 
5.12 
47.38 
4.16 
43.00 
4.57 
55.55 
6.04 
43.09 
1.81 
38.14 
3.55 
62.93 
5.04 
33.72 
3.07 
51.49 
5.65 
61.94 
4.24 
57.13 
3.86 
68.84 
2.94 
% women 
economically active  
58.47 
12.22 
54.31 
1.83 
44.69 
3.39 
77.22 
1.44 
67.99 
3.95 
55.61 
2.31 
55.19 
2.18 
39.75 
4.66 
60.44 
1.44 
42.49 
3.35 
76.16 
1.16 
71.94 
2.06 
59.91 
9.35 
66.55 
1.26 
37.69 
5.18 
73.39 
8.16 
56.69 
4.83 
62.90 
4.77 
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Table 4: Relationship between female educational attainment and the risk of union disruption, discrete-time event history models (standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 Austria  Flanders  Estonia  Finland  France  Germany  
Model A B A B A B A B A B A B 
Middle education -0.223** -0.248** 0.035 0.115 -0.075 -0.036 -0.070 0.074 0.191** 0.235** 0.253* 0.102 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.131) (0.134) (0.160) (0.163) (0.085) (0.086) (0.073) (0.074) (0.108) (0.111) 
High education -0.231* -0.270* -0.214 0.104 -0.285 -0.078 -0.155 0.221+ 0.228* 0.367** 0.310+ 0.285 
 (0.105) (0.105) (0.158) (0.173) (0.190) (0.196) (0.113) (0.117) (0.091) (0.095) (0.167) (0.174) 
Year of union 0.045** 0.032** 0.019 0.018 -0.008 -0.008 0.044** 0.015* 0.062** 0.059** 0.053** 0.057** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.014) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) 
Duration 0.013 0.112** 0.075+ 0.135** 0.050 0.060+ -0.052** 0.043* 0.090** 0.107** -0.075* 0.058 
 (0.017) (0.019) (0.045) (0.046) (0.033) (0.034) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.036) (0.038) 
Duration squared -0.002* -0.005** -0.004 -0.007* -0.006** -0.007** 0.001+ -0.002* -0.003** -0.003** 0.004* -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Parental divorce 0.777** 0.583** 1.023** 0.740** 0.376** 0.307** 0.713** 0.581** 0.368** 0.274** 0.789** 0.519** 
 (0.089) (0.091) (0.149) (0.155) (0.112) (0.113) (0.111) (0.112) (0.086) (0.088) (0.125) (0.129) 
Out-of-wedlock  0.013  0.592  0.468+  0.512**  0.175  0.127 
  (0.113)  (0.472)  (0.242)  (0.142)  (0.156)  (0.218) 
Age at start union  -0.106**  -0.160**  -0.098**  -0.085**  -0.074**  -0.095** 
  (0.013)  (0.030)  (0.021)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.021) 
Marriage (t)  -1.309**  -1.362**  -0.109  -1.449**  -0.309**  -1.389** 
  (0.093)  (0.155)  (0.105)  (0.096)  (0.084)  (0.118) 
Constant -7.425** -3.619** -6.197** -1.894 -2.843** -0.871 -6.869** -2.375** -8.746** -6.835** -7.827** -5.581** 
 (0.415) (0.489) (1.165) (1.251) (0.625) (0.760) (0.426) (0.520) (0.485) (0.567) (0.953) (0.978) 
Person-years 52697 52697 25338 25338 16353 16353 47473 47473 27540 27540 14758 14758 
Log-likelihood -4239.41 -4087.74 -1688.28 -1639.45 -1871.27 -1858.44 -4215.21 -4060.22 -4177.18 -4150.83 -1851.59 -1769.99 
Chi-square 297.32 600.66 48.58 146.23 82.31 107.95 196.74 506.73 181.07 233.77 93.35 256.55 
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Table 4.ctd. 
 
 Greece  Hungary  Italy  Latvia  Lithuania  Norway  
Model A B A B A B A B A B A B 
Middle education 0.357 0.432+ 0.023 0.142 0.429** 0.538** -0.213 -0.043 -0.542** -0.485* -0.026 0.118 
 (0.232) (0.235) (0.097) (0.100) (0.158) (0.161) (0.148) (0.150) (0.204) (0.204) (0.112) (0.114) 
High education 1.114** 0.842** -0.038 0.172 1.012** 1.112** -0.296+ -0.021 -0.352+ -0.245 0.008 0.213+ 
 (0.210) (0.227) (0.143) (0.152) (0.204) (0.221) (0.164) (0.170) (0.209) (0.211) (0.110) (0.116) 
Year of union 0.019 0.009 0.015 0.007 0.052** 0.056** 0.010 0.006 0.022* 0.021* 0.077** 0.026** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) 
Duration -0.182** -0.058 -0.071* -0.011 0.029 0.079* -0.020 0.021 0.060+ 0.074* -0.136** 0.011 
 (0.045) (0.049) (0.031) (0.033) (0.038) (0.039) (0.023) (0.024) (0.032) (0.032) (0.023) (0.025) 
Duration squared 0.005* 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003** -0.004* -0.004** 0.006** 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Parental divorce 1.204** 0.907** 0.417** 0.302** 1.240** 0.869** 0.415** 0.305** 0.620** 0.527** - - 
 (0.277) (0.284) (0.109) (0.111) (0.256) (0.265) (0.088) (0.090) (0.124) (0.127)   
Out-of-wedlock  0.420  0.554**  0.733*  0.322+  0.194  0.277* 
  (0.596)  (0.210)  (0.293)  (0.175)  (0.221)  (0.135) 
Age at start union  -0.030  -0.072**  -0.104**  -0.076**  -0.057**  -0.109** 
  (0.025)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.015)  (0.020)  (0.015) 
Marriage (t)  -1.855**  -1.535**  -2.207**  -0.913**  -0.870**  -1.628** 
  (0.215)  (0.136)  (0.202)  (0.120)  (0.223)  (0.105) 
Constant -6.176** -3.602** -4.918** -1.737* -10.03** -6.241** -3.966** -1.528* -5.816** -3.799** -9.043** -2.413** 
 (1.143) (1.213) (0.767) (0.828) (1.068) (1.148) (0.521) (0.598) (0.748) (0.872) (0.592) (0.713) 
Person-years 22803 22803 29587 29587 45856 45856 25675 25675 27318 27318 31409 31409 
Log-likelihood -857.47 -818.90 -2551.99 -2490.85 -1289.92 -1232.97 -3102.76 -3063.34 -1892.83 -1882.36 -3332.17 -3167.11 
Chi-square 111.32 188.46 49.08 171.35 69.05 182.95 96.32 175.16 55.23 76.16 270.81 600.91 
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Table 4.ctd. 
 
 Greece  Hungary  Italy  Latvia  Lithuania  
Model A B A B A B A B A B 
Middle education 0.357 0.432+ 0.023 0.142 0.429** 0.538** -0.213 -0.043 -0.542** -0.485* 
 (0.232) (0.235) (0.097) (0.100) (0.158) (0.161) (0.148) (0.150) (0.204) (0.204) 
High education 1.114** 0.842** -0.038 0.172 1.012** 1.112** -0.296+ -0.021 -0.352+ -0.245 
 (0.210) (0.227) (0.143) (0.152) (0.204) (0.221) (0.164) (0.170) (0.209) (0.211) 
Year of union 0.019 0.009 0.015 0.007 0.052** 0.056** 0.010 0.006 0.022* 0.021* 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.010) (0.012) (0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
Duration -0.182** -0.058 -0.071* -0.011 0.029 0.079* -0.020 0.021 0.060+ 0.074* 
 (0.045) (0.049) (0.031) (0.033) (0.038) (0.039) (0.023) (0.024) (0.032) (0.032) 
Duration squared 0.005* 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003** -0.004* -0.004** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Parental divorce 1.204** 0.907** 0.417** 0.302** 1.240** 0.869** 0.415** 0.305** 0.620** 0.527** 
 (0.277) (0.284) (0.109) (0.111) (0.256) (0.265) (0.088) (0.090) (0.124) (0.127) 
Out-of-wedlock  0.420  0.554**  0.733*  0.322+  0.194 
  (0.596)  (0.210)  (0.293)  (0.175)  (0.221) 
Age at start union  -0.030  -0.072**  -0.104**  -0.076**  -0.057** 
  (0.025)  (0.021)  (0.024)  (0.015)  (0.020) 
Marriage (t)  -1.855**  -1.535**  -2.207**  -0.913**  -0.870** 
  (0.215)  (0.136)  (0.202)  (0.120)  (0.223) 
Constant -6.176** -3.602** -4.918** -1.737* -10.03** -6.241** -3.966** -1.528* -5.816** -3.799** 
 (1.143) (1.213) (0.767) (0.828) (1.068) (1.148) (0.521) (0.598) (0.748) (0.872) 
Person-years 22803 22803 29587 29587 45856 45856 25675 25675 27318 27318 
Log-likelihood -857.47 -818.90 -2551.99 -2490.85 -1289.92 -1232.97 -3102.76 -3063.34 -1892.83 -1882.36 
Chi-square 111.32 188.46 49.08 171.35 69.05 182.95 96.32 175.16 55.23 76.16 
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Table 5: Significant differences between the effects of education on union disruption for first unions or divorce for first 
marriages 
 
  First unions First marriages Difference (mar 
– unions) 
Standard error 
(difference) 
Austria Middle -0.223** -0.205* 0.018 0.052 
 High -0.231* -0.273* -0.042 0.075 
Flanders Middle 0.035 -0.040 -0.075 0.064 
 High -0.214 -0.372* -0.158 0.096 
Estonia Middle -0.075 -0.092 -0.017 0.159 
 High -0.372 -0.285 0.252 0.173 
Finland Middle -0.070 -0.035 0.035 0.053 
 High -0.155 -0.139 0.016 0.082 
France Middle 0.191** 0.195* 0.004 0.047 
 High 0.228* 0.154 -0.074 0.069 
West-Germany Middle 0.253* -0.090 -0.343** 0.094 
 High 0.310+ -0.376 0.686** 0.191 
Greece Middle 0.357 0.338 -0.019 0.101 
 High 1.114** 0.697** 0.417** 0.137 
Hungary Middle 0.023 -0.060 -0.083+ 0.043 
 High -0.038 -0.074 -0.036 0.062 
Italy  Middle 0.429** 0.437** 0.008 0.005 
 High 1.012** 0.876** -0.136 0.126 
Latvia Middle -0.213 -0.126 0.087 0.077 
 High -0.296+ -0.160 0.136+ 0.081 
Lithuania Middle -0.542** -0.608** -0.066** 0.020 
 High -0.352+ -0.445* -0.093** 0.029 
Norway Middle -0.026 -0.009 0.015 0.096 
 High 0.008 0.086 0.078 0.101 
Poland Middle 0.342* 0.350* 0.008 0.039 
 High 0.299 0.363+ 0.064+ 0.035 
Spain  Middle 0.743** 0.798** 0.054 0.115 
 High 0.617** 0.390 -0.227 0.178 
Sweden Middle 0.024 -0.012 -0.036 0.115 
 High 0.064 0.020 -0.044 0.120 
Switzerland Middle 0.030 -0.187 -0.217** 0.063 
 High 0.314* 0.014 -0.300** 0.112 
USA Middle -0.221** -0.277** -0.056 0.036 
 High -0.289** -0.409** -0.120** 0.038 
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Table 6: Significance and direction of the change of the educational gradient of union disruption for the first unions 
 
 χ² / df 
difference 
p Middle 
education (ref: 
low) 
High 
education 
(ref: low) 
Middle * year 
of mar 
High *  
year of mar 
Austria 0.57 / 2 0.753 -0.236 -0.085 0.001 -0.008 
Flanders 1.91 / 2 0.385 0.139 0.210 -0.015 -0.046 
Estonia 0.32 / 2 0.853 -0.017 -0.117 -0.007 -0.016 
Finland 4.01 / 2 0.134 0.111 0.432 -0.012 -0.033* 
France 5.99 / 2 0.050 0.493** 0.603** -0.022* -0.027* 
Germany 0.51 / 2 0.773 0.219 0.523 0.003 -0.021 
Greece 10.46 / 2 0.005 -0.177 -0.032 0.064† 0.106** 
Hungary 4.73 / 2 0.094 0.227 0.530† -0.023 -0.058* 
Italy 3.96 / 2 0.138 0.604† 1.904** -0.014 -0.061* 
Latvia 4.11 / 2 0.128 0.128 0.270 -0.027 -0.044* 
Lithuania 8.45 / 2 0.015 -0.429 -0.935* -0.004 0.042 
Norway 1.54 / 2 0.462 0.207 0.305 -0.017 -0.021 
Poland 15.84 / 2 0.000 1.359** 1.633** -0.072** -0.091** 
Spain 1.90 / 2 0.369 0.869† 1.385* -0.008 -0.044 
Sweden 13.16 / 2 0.001 0.143 0.623** -0.013 -0.046** 
Switzerland 3.52 / 2 0.172 -0.025 0.658* 0.004 -0.024 
USA 28.85 / 2 0.000 -0.297* 0.134 0.005 -0.026** 
 
 
Table 7: Differences between the effect of the interaction education*year formation on union disruption for first unions and 
the effect of the interaction education*year marriage divorce for first marriages 
 
 p of model 
χ² - 
difference 
First unions 
First 
marriages 
Year formation 
*middle 
education 
First unions 
Year marriage 
*middle 
education 
First marriages 
Year 
formation 
*high 
education 
First unions 
Year marriage 
*high 
education 
First 
marriages 
Austria n.s. n.s. 0.001  0.013 -0.008 -0.004 
Flanders n.s. ** -0.015  -0.034 -0.046 -0.138** 
Estonia n.s. n.s. -0.007 -0.012 -0.016 -0.032 
Finland n.s. * -0.012 -0.034* -0.033* -0.054* 
France † † -0.022* -0.026* -0.027* -0.033+ 
Germany n.s. n.s. 0.003 -0.007 -.0.021 -0.071 
Greece ** n.s. 0.064+ 0.049 0.106** 0.010 
Hungary † * -0.023 -0.045* -0.058* -0.072* 
Italy n.s. † -0.014 -0.023 -0.061 -0.092* 
Latvia n.s. n.s. -0.027 -0.016 -0.044* -0.032 
Lithuania * * -0.004 -0.027 0.042 0.017 
Norway n.s. n.s. -0.017 -0.039 -0.021 -0.018 
Poland ** ** -0.072** -0.071** -0.091** -0.090** 
Spain n.s. n.s. -0.008 0.007 -0.044 -0.068 
Sweden ** ** -0.013 -0.057* -0.046** -0.096** 
Switzerland n.s. n.s. 0.004 0.009 -0.024 -0.011 
USA ** ** 0.005  0.000 -0.026** -0.030** 
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Table 8: Results from multi-level discrete-time event history models with each macro variable introduced separately. Standard errors between parentheses 
 
 No macro-variables Divorce laws Social policies Values Family 
practices 
Modernity and the labour market 
Micro & Macro 
variables 
A: 
Empty 
event-
history 
model 
B: Equation 
with micro 
variables 
only  
C: B & divorce laws (no & 
strict divorce as reference 
category) 
D: B & 
social 
expenditure 
% GDP 
E: B & 
Family 
cash 
benefits % 
GDP 
F: B & % 
atheists or 
non-
religious 
G: B & % 
‘divorce 
justifiable’ 
H: B & 
unconventio
nal family 
types 
I: B & 
degree 
urbanization 
J: B & 
Employmen
t in services 
K: B & 
economically 
active women 
(%)1 
   Less strict, 
more 
individual 
Pure 
unilateral 
divorce 
        
Middle education 
level 
 0.319 
(0.232) 
0.337 
(0.239) 
0.103 
(0.236) 
0.090 
(0.239) 
0.277 
(0.239) 
-0.012 
(0.273) 
0.301 
(0.250) 
0.394 
(0.265) 
0.576 
(0.241) 
0.926 
(0.264) 
High education 
level 
 1.386 
(0.280) 
1.350 
(0.292) 
1.121 
(0.289) 
1.207 
(0.289) 
1.403 
(0.291) 
1.081 
(0.340) 
1.398 
(0.293) 
1.873 
(0.322) 
1.639 
(0.284) 
2.466 
(0.313) 
Union year  0.032 
(0.002) 
0.027 
(0.003) 
0.026 
(0.003) 
0.031 
(0.002) 
0.032 
(0.003) 
0.028 
(0.003) 
0.016 
(0.003) 
0.030 
(0.003) 
0.013 
(0.003) 
0.030 
(0.003) 
Duration -0.094 
(0.004) 
-0.073 
(0.005) 
-0.076 
(0.005) 
-0.079 
(0.005) 
-0.072 
(0.005) 
-0.073 
(0.005) 
-0.077 
(0.005) 
-0.086 
(0.005) 
-0.075 
(0.005) 
-0.089 
(0.005) 
-0.073 
(0.005) 
Duration2  0.002 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
Parental divorce  0.504 
(0.026) 
0.506 
(0.026) 
0.506 
(0.026) 
0.506 
(0.026) 
0.504 
(0.026) 
0.505 
(0.026) 
0.513 
(0.027) 
0.503 
(0.026) 
0.506 
(0.025) 
0.503 
(0.026) 
Middle* Union 
year 
 -0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
High* Union year  -0.019 
(0.004) 
-0.017 
(0.004) 
-0.018 
(0.004) 
-0.018 
(0.004) 
-0.019 
(0.004) 
-0.017 
(0.004) 
-0.011 
(0.004) 
-0.017 
(0.004) 
-0.011 
(0.004) 
-0.016 
(0.004) 
Main effect macro 
variable 
  0.514 
(0.062) 
0.549 
(0.137) 
0.016 
(0.005) 
-0.009 
(0.004) 
0.012 
(0.006) 
0.013 
(0.004) 
0.008 
(0.001) 
0.014 
(0.006) 
0.040 
(0.004) 
0.014 
(0.003) 
Middle*macro 
variable 
  -0.225 
(0.083) 
-0.082 
(0.136) 
0.016 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.003) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
0.006 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.013 
(0.002) 
-0.011 
(0.002) 
High*macro 
variable 
  -0.134 
(0.108) 
-0.239 
(0.164) 
0.011 
(0.005) 
0.007 
(0.003) 
0.000 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.001) 
-0.009 
(0.003) 
-.016 
(0.003) 
-0.021 
(0.002) 
Variance at 
country level 
0.362 
(0.125) 
0.362 
(0.128) 
0.328 
(0.117) 
0.404 
(0.143) 
0.358 
(0.127) 
0.352 
(0.125) 
0.359 
(0.127) 
0.219 
(0.078) 
0.325 
(0.116) 
0.252 
(0.090) 
0.345 
(0.122) 
-2 log likelihood -680825 -670348 -684613 -657452 -667449 -678622 673785 -729520 -679913 -708957 -683424 
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Table 9: Union disruption Results from multi-level discrete-time event history models with all significant macro-
variables and their interactions with high and middle education. Standard errors in parentheses 
 
 L: B minus 
insignificant 
effects 
M: L & 
macro-
variables  
N: M & 
interactions 
between 
the macro-
variables 
and high 
education  
O: N without 
insignificant 
interaction 
terms 
High education level 1.178 
(0.244) 
1.115 
(0.237) 
1.698 
(0.306) 
1.927 
(0.262) 
Union year 0.029 
(0.002) 
0.009 
(0.003) 
0.008 
(0.003) 
0.008 
(0.003) 
Duration -0.073 
(0.005) 
-0.096 
(0.005) 
-0.095 
(0.005) 
-0.095 
(0.005) 
Duration2 0.001 
(0.000) 
0.002 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
0.001 
(0.000) 
Parental divorce 0.505 
(0.026) 
0.519 
(0.025) 
0.516 
(0.025) 
0.516 
(0.025) 
High education level * union year 
-0.016 
(0.003) 
-0.015 
(0.003) 
-0.010 
(0.003) 
-0.010 
(0.003) 
Employment in services   0.031 
(0.004) 
0.031 
(0.004) 
0.032 
(0.004) 
% women economically active  -0.010 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.003) 
Unconventional family types  0.004 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.001) 
0.004 
(0.001) 
% women economically active* High education level   -0.009 
(0.003) 
-0.013 
(0.002) 
Unconventional family types * High education level   -0.001 
(0.001) 
 
 
Employment in services * High education level   -0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.002) 
Variance at country level 0.361 
(0.128) 
0.225 
(0.080) 
0.214 
(0.076) 
0.214 
(0.077) 
-2 log likelihood 
-670232 -716230 -722394 -721994 
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Figure 1. Divorce trends (total divorce rate) in France, Hungary, Italy, Sweden and West-Germany 
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Source: Council of Europe (2003) Recent Demographic Developments in Europe 
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Figure 2. Percentage of first unions, first started as consensual unions, by decade when union began 
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Source: UNECE-PAU: Fertility and Family Surveys 
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Figure 2a to q. Changes across union-cohorts in the effects of educational attainment on the risk of union dissolution, odds 
ratios (reference category: lowest education, oldest cohort) 
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Appendices 
 
Table A1: Divorce legislation and social policies 
 
 Divorce  
legislation 
Social exp. % 
GDP 
Family cash 
ben. % GDP 
Austria Breakdown or other less restrictive (2) 1980: 23.3 
1990: 25.0 
1980: 2.73 
1990: 2.06 
Flanders Until 1975: Fault or other restrictive (1) 
Since 1975: Breakdown or other less 
restrictive (2) 
1980: 24.2 
1990: 24.6 
 
1980: 2.93 
1990: 2.19 
 
Estonia Until 1966: Fault or other restrictive (1) ¹ 
Since 1966: Breakdown or other less 
restrictive (2) ¹ 
1965: 11.6¹ 
1983: 13.8¹ 
1980: 0.3¹ 
1990: 0.3¹ 
Finland Until 1987: Breakdown or other less 
restrictive (2) 
Since 1987: No judicial ground to deny (3) 
1980: 18.5 
1990: 24.8 
 
1980: 1.07 
1990: 1.88 
France Until 1975: Fault or other restrictive (1) 
Since 1975: Breakdown or other less 
restrictive (2) 
1980: 21.1 
1990: 26.5 
 
1980: 2.18 
1990: 2.10 
West 
Germany 
Breakdown or other less restrictive (2) 1980: 20.3 
1990: 20.3 
1980: 1.60 
1990: 1.09 
Greece Until 1983: Fault or other restrictive (1) 
Since 1983: Breakdown or other less 
restrictive (2) 
1980: 11.5 
1990: 21.6 
 
1980: 0.34 
1990: 0.84 
Hungary Until 1964: Fault or other restrictive (1) 
Since 1964: Breakdown or other less 
restrictive (2) 
1965: 10.9 
1983: 18.7 
1980: 3.0 
1990: 2.6 
Italy Until 1971: Not permitted (0) 
1971-1987: Fault or other restrictive (1) 
Since 1987: Breakdown or other less 
restrictive (2) 
1980: 18.4 
1990: 23.9 
 
1980: 0.99 
1990: 0.72 
Latvia Until 1966: Fault or other restrictive (1) ¹ 
Since 1966: Breakdown or other less 
restrictive (2) ¹ 
1965: 11.6¹ 
1983: 13.8¹ 
1980: 0.3¹ 
1990: 0.3¹ 
Lithuania Until 1966: Fault or other restrictive (1) ¹ 
Since 1966: Breakdown or other less 
restrictive (2) ¹ 
1965: 11.6¹ 
1983: 13.8¹ 
 
1980: 0.3¹ 
1990: 0.3¹ 
Norway Until 1991: Breakdown or other less 
restrictive (2) 
Since 1991: Unilateral non-fault (3) 
1980: 18.6 
1990: 26.0 
 
1980: 1.25 
1990: 1.91 
Poland Until 1964: Fault or other restrictive (1) 
Since 1964: Breakdown or other less 
restrictive (2) 
1990: 16.2 
 
1990: 1.84 
1998: 0.93 
Spain Until 1981: Not permitted (0) 
Since 1981: Fault or other restrictive (1) 
1980: 15.8 
1990: 19.3 
1980: 0.45 
1990: 0.19 
Sweden  Until 1974: Breakdown or other less 
restrictive (2) 
Since 1974: No judicial ground to deny (3) 
1980: 29.0 
1990: 31.0 
 
1980: 1.75 
1990: 2.15 
Switzerland Breakdown or other less restrictive (2) 1980: 15.2 
1990: 19.8 
1980: 1.04 
1990: 1.02 
USA Until 1970: Fault or other more restrictive (1) 
1970-1985: Breakdown or other less 
restrictive (2) 
Since 1985: Unilateral non-fault (3) 
1980: 13.1 
1990: 13.4 
1980: 0.46 
1990: 0.22 
 
Sources: Chester (1977); Castles and Flood (1993); Glendon (1987; 1989); Goode (1993); Hamilton and Perry (2002); ILO 
(1967; 1988); OECD (1987-1998) Social Expenditure Database; Fajth and Zimakova (1997: 124). 
¹ Former USSR. 2 Not available. 
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Table A2: Economy 
 
 Urbanisation Women’s economic 
activity 
Employment in 
services 
Austria 1960: 66.8 
1990: 67.0 
1960: 53.0 
1990: 55.2 
1960: 29.89 
1990: 54.71 
Flanders 1960: 92.5 
1990: 96.5 
1960: 30.5 
1990: 47.8 
1960: 44.52 
1990: 69.6 
Estonia 1960: 57.5 
1990: 71.1 
1960: 67.3 
1990: 75.9 
1960: 35.6 
1990: 44.3 
Finland 1960: 38.1 
1990: 61.4 
1960: 55.5 
1990: 72.4 
1960: 37.1 
1990: 61.0 
France 1960: 62.4 
1990: 74.0 
1960: 43.6 
1990: 57.0 
1960: 39.2 
1990: 55.9 
West 
Germany 
1960: 76.1 ¹ 
1990: 85.3 ¹ 
1970: 48.1 ² 
1990: 57.0 ² 
1960: 37.3 
1990: 57.9 
Greece 1960: 42.9 
1990: 58.8 
1960: 26.3 
1990: 42.4 
1960: 26.6 
1990: 49.7 
Hungary 1960: 42.6 
1990: 62.0 
1960: 46.9 
1990: 59.3 
1960: 27.0 
1990: 46.9 
Italy 1960: 59.4 
1990: 66.7 
1960: 30.4 
1990: 45.0 
1960: 29.8 
1990: 60.0 
Latvia 1960: 56.9 
1990: 70.3 
1960: 64.3 
1990: 75.3 
1960: 32.4 
1990: 44.5 
Lithuania 1960: 40.0 
1990: 67.8 
1960: 61.2 
1990: 70.4 
1960: 25.4 
1990: 40.9 
Norway 1960: 49.9 
1990: 72.0 
1960: 26.8 
1990: 69.1 
1960: 43.5 
1990: 68.4 
Poland 1960: 47.9 
1990: 60.7 
1960: 62.1 
1990: 65.1 
1960: 23.1 
1990: 36.7 
Spain 1960: 56.6 
1990: 75.4 
1960: 20.3 
1990: 41.5 
1960: 26.3 
1990: 55.5 
Sweden  1960: 72.6 
1990: 83.1 
1960: 37.9 
1990: 80.6 
1960: 40.7 
1990: 65.9 
Switzerland 1960: 51.0 
1990: 59.7 
1960: 41.0 
1990: 60.7 
1960: 38.7 
1990: 59.8 
USA 1960: 70.0 
1990: 75.2 
1960: 40.6 
1990: 66.5 
1960: 56.8 
1990: 71.2 
 
Sources: World Bank World Development Indicators; ILO LABORSTA EAPEP Data http://laborsta.ilo.org/; Scharpf and 
Schmidt (2000: 349); United Nations Common Database (UNCDB) 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cdb/cdb_help/cdb_quick_start.asp 
¹ One Germany. ² Different dataset. 
Stability and change in the effects of female educational attainment on the risk of union dissolution 
33 
Table A3: Values and demographical practices 
 
 % non-
religious or 
atheist 
Divorce 
justifiable¹ 
Divorces / 100 
marriages 
% Extra-
marital births 
% 25-years 
old lived in 
consensual 
union  
Austria 1970: 2.6 
1990: 7.2 
1990: 4.87 1970: 19.6 
1990: 36.0 
1960: 13.3 
1990: 23.6 
1970: 13.4 
1990: 60.1 
Flanders 1970: 5.9 
1990: 7.2 
1981: 4.0 
1990: 4.90 
1970: 8.7 
1990: 31.5 
1960: 2.1 
1990: 11.6 
1980: 6.6 
1990: 16.9 
Estonia 1970: 53.3 
1990: 39.8 
1990: 5.44 1975: 47.0 
1985: 49.0 
1960: 13.7 
1990: 27.1 
1970: 30.5 
1985: 66.4 
Finland 1970: 3.6 
1990: 5.5 
1981: 5.81 
1990: 7.23 
1970: 14.8 
1990: 52.6 
1960: 4.0 
1990: 25.2 
1970: 9.9 
1985: 70.9 
France 1970: 12.0 
1990: 19.2 
1981: 5.34 
1990: 5.65 
1970: 9.9 
1990: 36.9 
1960: 6.1 
1990: 30.1 
1970: 15.4 
1990: 60.1 
West-
Germany 
1970: 3.9 
1995: 7.6 
1981: 4.91 
1990: 5.70 
1970: 18.1 
1990: 30.0 
1960: 6.3 
1990: 10.5 
43.8 
Greece 1970: 0.2 
1990: 1.8 
1999: 6.26 1970: 5.2 
1998: 14.1 
1965: 1.1 
1990: 2.2 
1975: 10.1 
1990: 29.0 
Hungary 1970: 14.3 
1990: 12.7 
1981: 4.51 1970: 23.6 
1990: 37.5 
1960: 5.5 
1990: 13.1 
1975: 6.8 
1985: 18.1 
Italy 1970: 11.4 
1990: 15.6 
1981: 5.07 
1990: 5.37 
1975: 2.8 
1990: 8.7 
1960: 2.4 
1990: 6.5 
1975: 1.4 
1990: 4.8 
Latvia 1970: 47.6 
1990: 35.8 
1990: 5.38 1975: 51.0 
1990: 49.0 
1960: 11.9 
1990: 16.9 
1975: 17.9 
1990: 40.0 
Lithuania 1970: 29.2 
1990: 14.5 
1990: 4.03 1975: 35.0 
1990: 55.0 
1960: 7.3 
1990: 7.0 
1975: 6.4 
1990: 16.4 
Norway 1970: 1.1 
1990: 2.2 
1981: 4.81 
1990: 5.26 
1970: 11.7 
1990: 46.4 
1960: 3.7 
1990: 38.6 
1975: 10.3 
1985: 61.0 
Poland 1970: 8.8 
1990: 3.1 
1990: 3.85 1970: 12.3 
1990: 16.6 
1960: 4.5 
1990: 6.2 
1970: 3.6 
1985: 4.3 
Spain 1970: 2.2 
1990: 5.4 
1981: 4.69 
1990: 5.59 
1985: 9.2 
1990: 10.5 
1970: 1.4 
1990: 9.6 
1975: 1.9 
1990: 9.9 
Sweden  1970: 24.7 
1990: 29.4 
1981: 6.09 
1990: 6.33 
1970: 29.9 
1990: 47.8 
1960: 11.3 
1990: 47.0 
1975: 71.0 
1990: 79.0 
Switzerland 1970: 1.1 
1990: 7.2 
1990: 4.77 1970: 13.7 
1990: 28.3 
1960: 3.9 
1990: 6.1 
1975: 18.4 
1990: 50.9 
USA 1970: 4.9 
1990: 8.7 
1981: 4.66 
1990: 4.89 
1970: 32.8 
1990: 48.4 
1980: 18.4 
1990: 28.0 
1975: 20.0 
1990: 67.0 
 
Sources: World Values Survey, waves 1981-1990-1995, weighted cases; European Values Survey, wave 1999, weighted 
cases; Council of Europe (2002) Recent Demographic Developments in Europe. Council of Europe, Strasbourg; OECD 
(2002) Social Indicators. 
¹ Society mean of a scale from 1 to 10. 
